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ABSTRACT
Croatian membership in the EU is subject to the fulfilment of
the legal and political obligations laid down in, among other places, the
SAA, the Stability and Association Agreement. The implementation of
the SAA depends on the definition of its position in the constitutional
system of the Republic of Croatia, including the ability for its provi-
sions to be directly applied in EU and in Croatian courts, the legal sta-
tus of the bodies provided for in the SAA, and the legal position and
legal standing of the decisions taken by these bodies. The implementa-
tion of constitutional changes is necessary for full membership of the
EU, and some changes are also necessary even for implementation of
the SAA. These are provisions that provide the legal basis for member-
ship in the EU, including the definition of the manner of making use of
state sovereignty, provisions that define in detail the legal status of
international law and European primary and secondary law in the inter-
nal legal system of the EU, and provisions that adapt the constitution-
al organisation of the Republic of Croatia to the conditions of associ-
ate or full membership of the EU, optimise the functions of the institu-
tions of state authority that will have to work in new conditions. In an
evaluation of the fulfilment of the conditions for membership in the
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EU, the criterion for evaluation of the extent to which the legal system
is adjusted will not be only the contents of the legal standards, but also
the political, economic and social matters that are governed by these
legal standards.
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL
REMARKS
It is an almost impossible task to make a diagnosis of the legal
system of some country and compare it with the legal system of the
EU. Looked at from a methodological point of view, such an effort is
pointless, and could possibly be useful only as an exercise in compar-
ative law. At the level of standards, the demands that the legal system
of every potential member state must meet are quite clear. Applicant
countries must unconditionally take on board the acquis communau-
taire, the legal patrimony, that is, the totality of all the legal standards
of the legal system of the EU. Comparing any two legal systems, that
of a given country and that of the EU, a meticulous investigator might
without any doubt come to some knowledge about the similarities or
differences in given legal rules, but the results of such a comparative
approach would have extremely little to say about the capacity of the
state the legal system of which is at issue to become a member of the
EU. And how much the legal rules, both national and supranational,
correspond to the social relationships that the applicant state would
have to put in order is a completely different question.
A large number of the conditions that applicant states have to
fulfil on the road to full integration into the EU are not to do with legal
standards, but rather relate to economics and politics. Law, then, as dis-
cipline, is an instrument for accomplishing them. The characteristics of
a legal system, the features of a legal culture and the substance of legal
institutes can certainly help or harm the social and economic process-
es, but in and of themselves they are not criteria according to which it
is possible to judge of the quality of a candidacy for EU membership.
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For example, it is possible for the UK to fulfil the criteria for member-
ship in spite of the fact that its legal system traditionally has no codex
of fundamental rights and liberties, while some applicant country will
still not meet these criteria, in spite of having comprehensive legislative
regulation of this matter. From this example it should be clear that
through no analysis of legal standards will we be able to determine the
level of preparedness of a given country for EU membership, rather it is
necessary to judge the extent to which criteria for membership are ful-
filled in a material sense, a precondition for which is the distinction of
the letter of the law and reality. Here it is necessary to make an impor-
tant demarcation. Some of the fundamental requirements for the rule of
law such as the principle of the division of powers, the democratic sys-
tem, multi-party politics and the independence of the judiciary consti-
tute the institutional context for a legal analysis and the regulation of the
standards, and they have to be taken into consideration, staying all the
way within legal methods. As, commenting on the distinction between
the provisions of the law and the political, Harvard professor David
Kennedy observed, American legal theory does not start with the found-
ing fathers of the American Constitution, Madison, Hamilton and Jay,
but with Oliver Wendell Holmes, who did not deal with the architecture
of political but the analysis of legal institutes (Holmes: 1996-1997).
Similarly, it could be said that the legal theory of the European Comm-
unity did not start with the ideological founders of the EU such as Ernst
B. Haas or Jean Monnet, but probably with Joseph Weiler, who was
among the first to bring out the double aspect of supranationalist think-
ing, the purely legal and the political (Weiler, 1982). 
The conceptual distinction of the regulatory and political
aspects is relevant for the current analysis, the subject of which should
be defined not only as an estimate of the harmonisation of the political
institutions and/or legal standards of Croatian with the those of
European law, but also as an analysis of the working of the legal stan-
dards in the political, social and economic context of rapprochement
with the EU. Here it is of minor importance whether some Croatian
legal institute governs a given relationship in law in the same way as
or in a different way from that in the EU; the primary question is
whether the given legal handling of a matter leads to real fulfilment of
the criteria for membership. This does not mean that I think a compar-
ison of the legal solutions and the fulfilment of the formal criteria are
not relevant for a judgement of the adjustment of a national legal sys-
tem to the European system. Precisely the opposite, the formal criteria
in the law are often topographical signs on the way towards full mem-
bership, and without their fulfilment the process of convergence can-
not possibly be continued. However, their fulfilment is only a neces-
sary, and never a sufficient condition, while for the success of the inte-
gration process it is necessary to create an appropriate political, eco-
nomic and social reality. For this, putting the legal regulations into the
political, economic and social context is one of the key tasks of
Croatian legal theory and practice.
In the light of these introductory remarks it is necessary then to
restrict the goal of this work. First of all there will be a review of the
formal steps that have to be taken on the road towards full membership
in the EU, then a determination of the current Croatian position, and a
comparison of this position with that of the applicant states. After that,
I shall identify the contextual restrictions that could have some impact
on the speed of rapprochement with the EU, and put forward recom-
mendations for laws that have to be taken at the constitutional level and
are necessary for a rapid adjustment of Croatia to standards for mem-
bership in the EU. 
THE ROAD TO WELLVILLE
The process of converging on the EU could be illustrated by the
title of T. C. Boyle’s novel The Road to Wellville, which speaks of the
therapeutic philosophy of the inventor of cornflakes Mr Kellogg,
according to whom the route to health and happiness leads through a
thorough purging of the organism. It is through such a purge that the
applicant states have to pass on the road to full membership.
In principle, every European country can become a member of
the EU. The making of an accession decision is a matter of a unani-
mous political decision of the Council of Ministers and a decision of
the EP pursuant to Article 49 of the EU Treaty (EUT below), which has
to be preceded by fulfilment of the conditions laid down in Article 6(1)
of the EUT. Article 49 of the ET says “Every European state that res-
pects the principles prescribed in Article 6(1) can seek membership in
the Union. It shall submit its application to the Council, which shall
make a decision unanimously, after which it takes counsel with the
Commission, and after this obtains the assent of the European
Parliament, which shall make a decision with the absolute majority of
the votes of its members”. According to Article 6(1) of the EUT “The
Union is based on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
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human rights and fundamental liberties, and the rule of law, which are
principles common to all states members”. 
These conditions were additionally defined by the conclusions
of the European Council of Copenhagen, according to which a state
applying for membership in the Union must meet the criteria of democ-
racy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the protection of
minorities, have a functioning market economy that can withstand the
comparative pressure in the EU, and the ability to take on the obliga-
tions of membership, including respect for the criteria of political, eco-
nomic and monetary union (Bull. European Commission 6-1992, Item
I.13). In other words, between the point of departure – the fact that a
given state is from a geographical point of view part of the European
continent – and the act of being received into membership of the EU, it
is necessary to pass a route that in the briefest outline could be described
as a process of adjustment of governmental institutions and of econom-
ic disarmament, i.e., the gradual abolition of trade barriers, such as cus-
toms, quotas and measures with the same effect, accompanied by the
reception of a large quantity, or rather, the totality, of the legal regula-
tions of European law known as the acquis communautaire.
The EU has undergone several waves of enlargement, by which
the original number of six members has been expanded to the current
fifteen; a new wave of enlargement to the countries of CEE is expect-
ed in the near future. Thus the original states members – Belgium,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany – were
joined in 1973 by the UK, Eire and Denmark, in 1981 by Greece, by
Spain and Portugal in 1986, and by Sweden, Finland and Austria in
1995. The current applicant countries are Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Poland, CR, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus,
Malta and Turkey. Experience from previous enlargements shows the
diversity of the processes that have preceded the act of enlargement,
and the diversity in the natures of the treaty relations between the
Union and the countries that have joined it. The formal names of these
legal instruments regulating the pre-accession period are no indicator
of the final outcome of the integration process and are different for
each individual example. The free trade agreements between the EU
and Spain and Portugal, which mainly governed commercial relations,
and which hence in scope and contents were narrower than the later
association agreements, brought these countries to membership in the
EU. The association agreement between the European Community and
Turkey is still not totally put into practice, in spite of the fact it was
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signed way back in 1963. The more recent practice of the Union shows
that the precondition for joining is the signing of an association agree-
ment, which, according to its material characteristics, sets up a free
trade zone, regulating not only trade relations but covering a much
wider set of material as well, involves the associated country in the
accomplishment of the objectives of the Union, sets up common insti-
tutions that have legislative authority, like the Association Council;
this agreement is concluded for an indefinite period of time. Turkey
applied to be received as a member of the EU in 1987. In the preamble
to the Decision on the Accession Partnership Decision it says: “The
European Council held in Helsinki announced that Turkey is an appli-
cant state that is predetermined to join the Union pursuant to the same
criteria that relate to other applicant countries and that, developing the
existing European strategy, Turkey, like the other applicant states, will
have benefits from the pre-accession strategy that will encourage and
support its reforms”. As Smith and Herzog point out (Konstantinidis,
ed: 1996, 51, 52):
“...association means a close and lasting cooperation with the
Community. Mere interest in financial or trade arrangements that leave
treaties about consultations to one side is not enough. Such treaties
include only the exchange of reciprocal benefits, while association
implies common objectives and a common institutional framework”. 
The performance of the obligations assumed via an association
agreement is accompanied by reports from the European Commission
and the Council. These reports are of crucial importance for an esti-
mation of the outcome of the next step on the road to full membership
of the Union – the submission of an application by an associated state
for reception into full membership. After the submission of this appli-
cation the next important phase is constituted by the accession part-
nership, in a formal sense, a decision of the EU Council defining in
more detail the role of the EU in the process of the integration of the
applicant country. The concept of accession partnership was worked
out at a meeting of the European Council in Luxembourg in December
1997, when it was decided that this instrument was to be the key ele-
ment of reinforced pre-accession strategy through which, within a
united framework, all forms of aid to applicant countries would be
mobilised in order to direct this aid towards the specific needs of each
one of them.
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The first accession partnerships were accepted in March 1998
pursuant to Article 235, today Article 308, of the European Comm-
unity Treaty (ECT), which stipulates that “if during the work of the
common market the action of the Community is necessary in order to
achieve one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty does
not provide for the necessary authorities, the Council shall, working
unanimously at the recommendation of the Commission and after con-
sultation with the European Parliament, undertake the appropriate
measures”. The application of this provision indicates that there are an
insufficient number of treaty provisions governing accession to the
Union. 
The third phase in the process of the accession of applicant
states to the Union covers amendments to the founding treaty, that is,
constitutional changes within the Union itself, in order to make possi-
ble the full participation of the representatives of the new states mem-
bers in its institutions, and in order to ensure internal cohesion in the
Union (Luxembourg Council Conclusions, 1997). After a unanimous
decision of the Council and the assent of the EP, an accession treaty is
concluded with the applicant country. Such treaties have the signifi-
cance of constitutional amendments in the legal system of the EU, and
have to be ratified by the institutions of the EU and the national parlia-
ments of all the states members.
Because of the large number of actors taking part in the associ-
ation process, all of whom have the power of veto, it is impossible to
predict the dynamics of the integration process. Looked at institution-
ally, this dynamics can be affected to lesser or greater extent by the
Commission, the Council, the EP and every single member state. After
the positive outcome of the referendum recently held in Ireland, which
made possible ratification of the Treaty of Nice, the process of enlarge-
ment currently depends on the view of Greece about the integration of
the Republic of Cyprus. As is well known, part of Cyprus is controlled
by Turkish forces. Currently, the position of the Greek government is
that Cyprus can become an EU member only as a single and united
state, and declares that it is ready to use its right of veto on the recep-
tion of other candidates if Cyprus is not accepted. In the sequel of this
paper we shall not deal with political considerations, rather lay out the
political problems related to the harmonisation of Croatian law and the
legal system of the EU. In so doing, we shall first of all examine the
current position occupied by Croatia on the map of the accession
process, and state the main problems that will have to be addressed.
230
CROATIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:
THE EXISTING STATE OF AFFAIRS
Croatia signed its SAA with the EU and its states members on
29 October 2001. Through this agreement, Croatia obtained the status
of potential candidate or applicant for membership in the EU. Before
Croatia, the FYR of Macedonia signed a similar agreement with the EU,
on 9 April 2001. For it to come into force, the Croatian SAA has to be
ratified by the Croatian Parliament, the EP and the parliaments of all the
states members. So far it has been ratified by the Croatian Parliament (5
December 2001), the EP (12 December 2001), Austria (26 February
2002), Ireland (17 April 2002) and Denmark (30 April 2002). In the
meantime, until the SAA really comes into force, on 28 January 2002
the Council accepted an Interim Agreement which has given effect to
the economic provisions of the Agreement.i
The first European Commission report about the process of sta-
bilisation and association in Croatia was published on 4 April 2002
(SEC/2002/341); this can serve as the point of departure for an estimate
of the progress of Croatia and a comparison of the country with the
applicant countries. It is possible to discern in the report the importance
of satisfying the political criteria, for it is on the fulfilment of them that
the evaluation of the implementation of the whole process depends.
Three main political conditions relate to the reinforcement of democra-
cy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of
minorities, and to regional cooperation. As stated in the report, demo-
cratic institutions in Croatia function on the whole well. A particular
problem is stated to be the judiciary, which “suffers from serious prob-
lems of organisation, procedural inefficiency, lack of expertise and the
excessive length of procedures. Radical reforms are needed, and no real
progress has been made. This weakness directly affects the accomplish-
ment of the rule of law, which remains problematic and uneven” (Item
2.1., p. 4). Particular emphasis is placed on the worrying tendency for
politically sensitive court decisions not to be implemented, and the exe-
cution of them is stated as a priority (Item 2.1.2., p. 6).
The priorities that need to be settled in the 12 month period after
the publication of the report cover:
• redefinition of the concept of the expatriate community in electoral leg-
islation and a proportional and appropriate representation for minorities;
231
• reform of the judiciary, including the settling of delayed cases,
reform of legal education and training of judges and state attorneys;
• complete respect for human rights, including the passing of a consti-
tutional law for the protection of minorities;
• legal definition of the framework of Croatian Radio Television and
its conversion into an independent public service;
• reinforcement of regional cooperation;
• reinforcement of cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague and the
fulfilment of existing obligations;
• acceleration of the return of property to refugees (Item 3.1, p. 14).
For the purpose of executing the obligations assumed in the
SAA, the government of the EU accepted the Association Implem-
entation Plan, according to which it publishes monthly reports. The last
report was published in June 2002, and according to the latest figures,
of the 128 measures that have to be carried out in the period given, 65
have been carried out. Of these 36 laws planned to be passed, 12 have
not so far seen the light.ii Among the laws planned but not so far passed
are the exceptionally important proposals through which protection of
minorities, reform of the judiciary, public television, government of
the system of state aid and consumer protection should be handled
(Adjustments, passim).
If we compare the Croatian reform agenda with the current obli-
gations of some of the applicant countries, we can see that some of
them have to face similar reform problems. For example, in the area of
meeting the political criteria, Slovenia has to carry out a reform of the
civil service, which means the passage of a law concerning civil ser-
vants, and it has to repair the situation in the justice system, in partic-
ular by reducing the number of unsettled cases (Report Slovenia,
2001). The state of affairs in the judiciary, particularly in the Supreme
Court, is one of the reform priorities of Hungary too, alongside which
is mentioned the political obligation to improve the position of the
Romany (Proposal Hungary). The CR, alongside the obligation to
reform the judiciary and the civil service is also bound to improve the
status of the Romany minority and to control the work of the police
(Proposal CZ Republic).
However, what definitely needs stressing is that the harmonisa-
tion efforts of the individual applicant states are doubly conditioned:
by the dynamics of the political, economic and legal reform processes,
and by the participation of the EU in their implementation. In this con-
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text, Croatia is limited by the range of the objectives and purposes of
the SAA and by the political will of the EU to take an active part in and
help the integration process. In this the political criteria are a signal that
can speed up or slow down the integration process. Although the prob-
lems of the candidate states, like those described, are essentially simi-
lar to those faced by Croatia, it is the political evaluation of the EU
about the satisfactory or unsatisfactory manner in which the criteria
stated are addressed that is crucial.
LEGAL PROBLEMS AND
CONTEXTUAL LIMITATIONS
The application of the SAA depends on the implementation of
numerous political and legal activities defined in detail in the
Implementation Plan, and can on the whole be defined as international
political obligations. The implementation of these obligations depends on
the effectiveness of the executive and the civil service. From a legal point
of view, the application of the Agreement depends upon:
• the legal position of the SAA in the constitutional systems of the EU and
the Republic of Croatia, including the possibility of applying the provisions
of the SAA directly before the courts in the EU and in Croatia;
• the legal status of the bodies provided for in the Agreement;
• the legal position and legal force of the decisions that these bodies make.
With respect to the way these factors are interwoven, they will be
considered in their common context.
The legal system of the law of the European Community is differ-
ent from the legal system of international law. As far back as 1963 the
European Court in Luxembourg adopted the stance that the legal position
of the then European Community constituted a “new legal order” (Van
Gend en Loos). The evolution of the legal system of European law has in
the meantime progressed to such an extent that today one talks of the
“legal system of the EU”, of course, in the sense of the constitutional sys-
tem of the EU as international organisation. According to practice of the
European Court, association agreements are an integral part of the legal
order of the Community, are applied directly, create rights and obligations
for natural and legal entities and the courts of the states members are
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bound to accord legal effect to the provisions (Haegeman). Although
there are certain differences in the interpretation of the legal rules of an
association agreement and of the primary European law (Polydor), there
is no doubt that the provisions of an association agreement do have the
status that, from the point of view of the EU, is equivalent and equal to
that of primary European law. In the applicant states the provisions of
association agreements are on the whole interpreted like the provisions of
other treaties, and at the moment these countries actually accede to the
EU, the legal regime governed by these contracts will be modified.
Looked at comparatively, there is nothing quite like EU accession
and the legal integration that is currently under way. Certain historical
similarities can be found in the US, however. For example, the debate that
was once carried on between the federalists and the anti-federalists in con-
nection with the concept of states’ rights does have a certain importance
for the constitutional debate in the applicant countries. The CEE countries
have no precedents in their legal practice for their association agreements
with the EU. For this reason it is not surprising that their legal status in
the national legal systems is governed by the same constitutional provi-
sions that govern the legal status of treaties in general. This lack of differ-
entiation also marks, among other things, the uncertain status of the legal
regulations of international law in the legal systems of these countries.
For instance, the Croatian Constitution (Article 140) stipulates a monistic
principle, but the bodies of government have a problem in abandoning the
previous dualistic practice (Rodin, 1995; 783).
Irrespective of whether this kind of approach derives from the
legal tradition and culture of socialist law that promoted a dualistic
approach in the relations of national and international law (Balas) or
from the idea that the integration process can be mastered by the appli-
cation of existing constitutional standards, as in Italy, which consid-
ered that existing constitutional provisions were sufficient for the rati-
fication of Maastricht, most transitional countries have been faced with
a common problem that could be described as a gap between the
demands of the integration process and the rigidity of their constitu-
tional models and traditions. In other words, while the constitutional
frameworks of EU states members have adapted to the relations of
interdependence and gone through a process termed a constitutional
revolution by Joseph Weiler (Weiler, 1991; 2403) the legal and consti-
tutional systems of the applicant countries, or potential applicants,
have remained more or less unchanged and thus are insensitive to the
demands that are being made by European integration.
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For all the states that entered into the type of treaty relationship
with the EU described, the association agreement has meant much more
than any other treaty in international law. In terms of their complexity
and the nature of the obligations assumed, association agreements are a
draft for an all-embracing social, economic and legal transformation, and
hence permeate the totality of the social reality of the states parties. This
is confirmed by Article 69 of the SAA between the EU and the Republic
of Croatia, which is an example of a harmonisation clause typical of this
kind of treaty or agreement: “The parties ascribe important to the har-
monisation of existing Croatian legislation with the legislation of the
Community. Croatia will endeavour to ensure the gradual harmonisation
of existing laws and any future legislation with the legal patrimony of the
Community (the acquis).” In the area of law, the obligations assumed
pursuant to the SAA include the obligation to carry out complex and rad-
ical constitutional and legal reforms. As Chris Patten recently said,
speaking of SAAs in general: “These treaties are legally binding agree-
ments. They prescribe rights and transfer rights to the states they refer to.
These are strict agreements, because they include the fundamental prin-
ciples that are the foundation for membership in the EU – free trade with
the EU and the associated disciplines, the principles of market competi-
tion and the rules about state aid, rights of intellectual property and so
on”.iii
Apart from the need for the fulfilment of the material provisions
of the association agreement, it is also necessary to carry out a reform
to be able to create an interface between national and European law, to
open up the legal systems of the application countries for the applica-
tion of the supranational, European legal sources. This kind of interface
should give legal definition to the status of European law in the nation-
al legal system, and allow for direct implantation of Community law
and “association law”, i.e., law that is based directly or indirectly on the
SAA. There are at least two additional elements of such an interface,
which we shall not embark on in detail here. These are the constitution-
al basis for association with/accession to the EU, and an appropriate and
effective national institutional framework making it possible to run an
effective integration policy, which implies the need to create a pro-
Europe consensus to facilitate the accomplishment of the other aims
stated. Applicant countries have addressed these problems in different
ways, and there are considerable differences in the provisions concern-
ing the status of treaties in their legal systems.
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In Bulgaria, for instance, ratified treaties that are in force are
equivalent to national regulations and have a legal force above statutory
law (Constitution, Article 5). In the CR, treaties that govern the material
of human rights are “immediately binding” and have a force above sta-
tute. Thus Article 10 of the CR Constitution states: “Published treaties
the ratification of which has been accepted by Parliament and which bind
the CR are part of the legal system; if the treaty is different from statute,
then the treaty must be applied” (395.2001 Sb [Official Gazette]). The
Estonian Constitution (Article 3) and the Hungarian Constitution (article
7) speak only of general rules of international law, but the Hungarian in
addition defines the obligation to harmonise national law with interna-
tional obligations. Article 9 of the Polish Constitution stipulates the obli-
gation to respect the obligatory rules of international law, and Article 87
says that ratified treaties are a source of national law. The Slovak
Constitution, Article 7 (5) prescribes the derogatory power of directly
applicable treaties vis-à-vis the usual laws: “Treaties concerning human
rights and fundamental liberties, treaties that do not require implementa-
tion pursuant to the law, and treaties that directly prescribe the rights and
obligations of natural and legal entities, and which have been ratified and
announced in a manner prescribed by law, have priority over Slovak
laws.” The Slovene Constitution (Article 8) affords perhaps the most
comprehensive solution for the application of treaties, which, once rati-
fied, may be implemented directly. The Croatian and Macedonian con-
stitutions (Articles 140 and 118 respectively) say that ratified treaties
constitute part of the national legal system and supra-statutory legal force
is guaranteed for them. However, these constitutions say nothing of the
direct implementation of treaties. Nevertheless, the possibility of the
direct application of treaties does exist in Croatia, and sometimes the
Croatian courts will allow them to have immediate effect.
Such a diversity of constitutional solutions should not be surpris-
ing in the light of the fact that even within the EU the states members have
various different approaches to the status of the legal regulations of inter-
national law. Thus the UK accepts a pronouncedly dualistic concept,
while the Netherlands is an example of legal monism. Nevertheless, this
diversity of approach does not have any effect on the final outcome, i.e.,
on allowing the legal rules of European law direct effect. As for the appli-
cant states, the lack of constitutional standards to regulate the effects of
European law shows that most applicant or associate states do not differ-
entiate between association agreements and the rest of international law.
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In a word, from the point of view of constitutional law, and in the
absence of any specific constitutional provisions specifically to gov-
ern association agreements, the interpretive paradigms that are appli-
cable to these associations are the same as those that are applied to
other international law agreements, and their direct application is not
automatic, that is, they do not have a self-executing character, irrespec-
tive of the understanding of the European Court, which the courts of
the associated countries are not obliged to consider. Although there is
some technical justification in this approach, it can lead to difficulties
in the application of association agreements and the process of the har-
monisation of national with European law. We will mention the
instance of only one associated country that does not admit self-execut-
ing status to the association agreement, and yet in joining the EU will
take on the obligation to ascribe this status to all other agreements that
the EU has previously entered into with third states. Even if this does
not technically create a problem, the very change of the interpretive
paradigm will require a certain adjustment. Although the absence of
express provisions about the position of an association agreement in
the national constitutions does not prevent national courts from imple-
menting them, the fact that they do not exist must certainly discourage
the courts from applying them. As Cremona puts it (Craig and de
Burca. 1999; 143): the relation between the legal systems is a matter of
the legal system of the Community, irrespective of the views that the
other contractual part has; bona fide execution of a contract in the sense
of international law is not conditional upon the legal mechanisms that
the parties might choose to accomplish its objectives. For this reason,
as long as both sides fulfil their obligations, the fact that one party
ascribes direct application to the provisions of the treaty, and the sec-
ond does not, will not affect the reciprocity of the treaty. 
The problem of the direct implementation of the laws of the
association treaties is exacerbated by the fact that the association agree-
ments invoke the implementation of the law of the European Comm-
unity in their application. For example, Article 63(2) of the Hungarian
association agreement says that every practice that is in contravention
of the provisions governing market competition “shall be judged pur-
suant to the criteria that derive from the application of articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty [of Rome]”. There is similar diction in other associa-
tion agreements, and it is taken over in the stabilisation and association
agreements. Thus Article 70(2) of the EU and Croatian SAA says:
“Every action in contravention of this Article shall be judged pursuant
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to the criteria that derive from the application of the rules about market
competition in the Community, especially articles 81, 82, 86 and 87 of
the EUT and interpretive instruments adopted by the institutions of the
Community”. This wording shows that the associated countries have
not only assumed the obligation adopting the rules of the European
Community about market competition, but have also committed them-
selves to interpreting these rules according to the way the community
itself interprets them. In this way elements of the acquis are being
brought into the legal relationship that in the associated countries is
understood as a relationship of international law. 
When the Constitutional Court of Hungary had to face these
problems, it concluded that the “principle of favor conventionis will be
applied to the limits up to which such a kind of interpretation of nation-
al law in line with international would be understood as a breach of the
Hungarian Constitution” (Volkai, 1999). Thus the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court has adopted a way of thinking similar to that from the pre-
vious constitutional practice of the constitutional courts of some of the
member countries, especially of Italy, in the Frontini case, or Germany
in the Maastricht cause. The decision of the Hungarian Constitutional
Court is explained in greater detail than any other similar decision in the
associated countries, i.e., a decision addressing the relationship of
national law and the legal system of the EU. However, however much
the logic of this decision might seem correct, it has not settled the main
problem. The Europe Agreements provide for the application of the
laws of the EU in market competition so that these rules should promote
economic rationalisation and facilitate the integration of the associated
countries into the EU. The non-application of these legal rules in the
associate membership period would undermine the very goals of the
association agreement. Finally, association agreements differ from the
other treaties in international law in that their objective is the accession
of a state party to the EU. For this reason, the courts, I would hold,
would have to take this objective into account in the interpretation of the
agreements. An opinion of the Polish Constitutional Courtiv would tend
to confirm this; it expressed its readiness to interpret national law in the
light of the laws of the Community, and this is justified by the need to
respect obligations assumed pursuant to the Europe Agreement.
“Naturally, EU law does not have any binding power in Poland. The
Constitutional Court, however, wishes to stress the provisions of articles
68 and 69 of the Europe Agreement in which an association between the
Republic of Poland on the one hand and the European Community and
its states members on the other was established. Poland thus has the obli-
gation to undertake ... everything it can in order to ensure that future laws
shall be harmonised with the regulations of the Community.”
And further:
“... The Constitutional Court considers that the obligation to ensure the
harmonisation of the legislation (which pertains primarily to the govern-
ment and to the Parliament) also creates the obligation that the existing
laws should be interpreted in such a way as to ensure the highest possi-
ble degree of such harmonisation.”
Some German authors, Bleckmann for instance, consider that
the Europe agreements have not created any kind of supranational legal
system and that they remain within the domain of classic international
law. This understanding is backing up by the claim that the European
Community is a creation of international law, and that, in line with this,
its states members remain “masters of the treaty”. According to this
author, the institutes founded pursuant to an association agreement,
i.e., the decisions of the Council for Stabilisation and Association, do
not of themselves have any legal application in the legal system of the
EU or in the legal systems of the states members, but should rather be
incorporated into the secondary legislation (Bleckman, 1997; 503).
This opinion has been subject to increasingly severe criticism. Thus
Pernice says:
“An estimate of the many proposals discussed and consideration of
concrete steps for the explanation and, if necessary, supplementation
of the European system of competences in a changed constitutional
treaty should be based on a common understanding of the actual
nature of the Union. My view is that it is not an international organi-
sation the masters of which are the states members the instruments of
which comprehend their citizens because the instruments of the mem-
ber states recognise their validity. I propose that this be conceived as
a multi-level constitutional system that consists, depending on the case,
of local, regional, national and European levels of political integration
and action and for this reason as a system of multi-level competences
that are established so as to be able to satisfy the needs of the citizens
at an appropriate level as effectively as possible.”
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Article 6 of the Croatian Implementation of the SAA Law (NN
MU 15/1991) is an example of a radically dualist approach, decisions
of the Stabilisation and Association Council having to be ratified by
the Croatian Parliament. This is a deviation from the monistic princi-
ple laid down in the Constitution, in Article 140, according to which
ratified treaties do make a part of national law; however, the constitu-
tionality of this provision is questionable.
This point of view, which is not alone in the constitutional prac-
tice of the associated states, is in contravention of the settled practice
of the European Court as developed in the interpretation of earlier
association agreements. Apart from that, I would say that such practice
does not contribute to efforts for the adjustment of national law to the
legal system of the European Union. It is, that is, possible, as alterna-
tive to the classical approach of international law to find different solu-
tions, and some of these possible solutions are indeed in accordance
with the common practice in the interpretation of treaties. An obvious
example can be found in the favor conventionis interpretive principle,
that is, in the interpretation of national law in accordance with the
treaty. This concept is well known, and by way of example Germany
or England and Wales can be cited (McCarthy v Smith; Hood Phillips:
1980, 31). In Germany this concept is known as Völkerrecht-
freundliche Auslegung and its application is not limited to the law of
the EU. As explained by the Federal Constitutional Court in the inter-
pretation of the European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Liberties “all laws, present and future, must
be interpreted in the light of the Convention” (BVerfGE 74, 358/370/;
Frowein: 1987).
According to this approach, the national courts of the associat-
ed countries can interpret the provisions of national law in accordance
with the association agreement, taking into consideration the current
state of affairs of the acquis, including the practice of the European
Court. Such practice could well lead to gradual acceptance of the direct
effect of directly applied provisions of primary and perhaps of second-
ary law too that derive from the association agreement. An argument
in favour of this approach is that the associated countries, assuming
their treaty obligations, did intend to conform their national legal sys-
tems to the legal system of European law. The consequence of such an
intention is the obligation to interpret national law and the association
agreement in line with the acquis communautaire. But this still does
not mean that the relation between the Union and a partner country has
features of the constitution of the EU (Cremona 2000, 92).
239
240
REFORM OF THE FRAMEWORK OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ENTAILED BY THE
PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The outlook for Croatian full membership of the EU requires the
implementation of constitutional modifications and the amendment of a
number of legal approaches. Some of these changes are necessary right
at this moment, as part of the implementation of the SAA, and some are
essential because of the outlook of full EU membership. However, it is
assumed that Croatia will best express its genuine desire for full mem-
bership of the EU by now, at the constitutional level, creating the
assumptions for full membership. The proposed changes can be put in
a number of groups. They are:
a) provisions that provide the legal basis for EU membership, including
the government of the manner in which state sovereignty is exercised;
b) provisions that define in more detail the legal status of international
law and European primary and second law within the internal legal
system of the Republic of Croatia;
c) provisions through which the constitutional organisation of the
Republic of Croatia is adjusted to the conditions of associate or full
membership in the EU and the functions of the institutions of gov-
ernment that will have to work in new conditions are optimised;
d) provisions that govern the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.
With reference to a). The existing constitutional definition of
state sovereignty is insufficiently adapted to the conditions of member-
ship of the EU. For this reason it would be necessary to stipulate that
state sovereignty cannot be alienated, or divided or transferred in the
sense of the presently valid Article 2 of the Constitution, but is used in
concert with other states. This change is based on a contemporary
understanding of sovereignty as a possibility of taking part in the mak-
ing of decisions in international relations (not summa potestas but a
place at the table).
With reference to b). The second part of the proposed modifica-
tions relates to settling and defining the status of European law in the
Croatian legal system. In this segment it should be stipulated that
treaties that are of a self-executing nature (that are clear, unambiguous
and unconditional) need not be additionally processed but simply
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directly applied, i.e., they serve as the legal base for the making of indi-
vidual acts. This goes for all treaties that are of a self-executing nature,
for example, for the European Human Rights Convention, and certain-
ly for the SAA, and for all legal standards that are based on this agree-
ment. According to the current state of affairs, Article 6 of the SAA
Implementation Law starts from a radically dualist understanding, the
decisions of the SA Council having to be ratified by the Croatian
Parliament. This kind of approach deviates from the monistic principle
laid down in the Constitution, according to which treaties are automat-
ically a part of the legal system of the Republic of Croatia, although the
constitutionality of this, as we remarked earlier, is disputable.
With reference to c). In the conditions of associate, and in par-
ticular of full, membership of the EU it is necessary to coordinate the
working of the main institutional stakeholders, particularly the parlia-
ment and the government. Considering that the SAA was not ratified
by the two thirds majority necessary to enable transfer of regulatory
authorities to the SA Council, the Croatian government has to carry out
the decisions of this body. It would here be sensible to prescribe the
obligation of the government to inform the Parliament in due time
about its regulatory activities related to the execution of its treaty obli-
gations. The current state of affairs is regulated by Article 112, Para-
graph 4 of the Constitution, which authorises the government to make
decrees for the execution of the laws, and hence decrees for the execu-
tion of the law concerning the ratification of treaties, but only those
that have been ratified by an ordinary majority. This is logical, because
this manner of ratification does not make it possible to transfer legisla-
tive authority to bodies founded by treaties. Since this is concerned
with decrees for the execution of a law, it is logical that the Parliament
should be informed in advance. Still, in this area of regulation the gov-
ernment does have original constitutional authority and the parliament
can prevent the government passing them only by a vote of no-confi-
dence. However, the need for the government to take part in the pass-
ing of decisions in the SA Council, and later in the Council of
Ministers of the EU, calls for a change in the existing solution; it is
necessary to provide for direct constitutional authority of the govern-
ment to take part in the making of such decisions, with the simultane-
ous obligation to inform parliament regularly about this kind of activ-
ity. A similar approach has been provided for in the French
Constitution. A special problem is a situation when, for the implemen-
tation of a treaty, it is necessary pass some law, or when the legal mate-
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rial that the treaty regulates belongs to the area of so-called legislative
reserves. This is the case, for instance, with electoral laws. Then it is
necessary for the legislative government to take part directly, but only
if a treaty is not of a self-executing nature. If it is a self-executing treaty
that is concerned, no additional legislative regulation will be needed,
rather the treaty is applied directly. For this reason it should be pre-
scribed that the parliament may transfer its legislative authority to the
government if two conditions are fulfilled: a) that a treaty is not self-
executing and b) it is not a legislative reserve that is concerned.
With respect to d). Changes are necessary too in the area of the
authority of the constitutional court; some of these changes have
already bee introduced in the practice of this court.
Firstly, it is necessary to say that the Constitutional Court should
decide whether, before the ratification of some treaty, it is necessary to
carry out constitutional changes. If no changes are necessary, there is a
presumption of the conformity of the Constitution and the treaty and the
ratification of it ceases to be a problem of constitutional law. Similar
solutions exist in the constitutions of Germany, Slovenia and elsewhere.
For a complete legal settlement of this institute in the Republic of
Croatia it is necessary to put through modifications of the Constitutional
Law concerning the Constitutional Court. This law, that is, has to pre-
scribe who can start off this procedure, and it would be good for it to be
the same persons that can launch a procedure for the abstract evaluation
of constitutionality. For the needs of full membership in the EU (but not
before) it is necessary to define constitutional procedural law so as to
bring it into line with the practice of the European Court, as for exam-
ple in Simmenthal. This can be done via amendments to the
Constitutional Law and/or by changes in the Courts Law. The contents
of these changes would relate to a change in the legal institute of excep-
tio illegalitatis by the regular courts in the event of some lack of har-
monisation of some legal regulation of Croatian law with some regula-
tion of EU law. This would bypass the need for the procedure of the
abstract evaluation of constitutionality before the Constitutional Court.
Secondly, it is necessary, along the lines of German constitu-
tional law, to introduce the competence of the Constitutional Court to
adjudicate on the existence of legal rules of universal international
public law. This must be done in every case, particularly for the pur-
pose of the SAA and later full membership in the EU, since in
European law, the standards of universal international law are regular-
ly applied, and from this point of view, our legal system has to be
brought into line. 
Thirdly, the possibility for the Constitutional Court to evaluate
the compliance of laws and other regulations with treaties already
exists today pursuant to the practice of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Croatia, according to which it has been established that
contravention by a law of a treaty is at the same time a violation of
Article 5 of the Constitution, i.e., of the principle of constitutionality
and legality. This practice is thus made constitutional. However,
because the legal regulations of European law, including the legal reg-
ulations made by the SA Council, according to well-established rules
of European law, have a supra-statutory force and many of them are
self-executing, it will, from this point of view, be necessary additional
to handle Croatian procedural law in order to avoid the Constitutional
Court having to decide on the accord of laws and byelaws with second-
ary sources of European law, for this would be in contravention of
European law. In any event, when the Republic of Croatia becomes a
full member of the EU, the Constitutional Court will not be able to
evaluate the accord between a law and the European Union Treaty,
rather it is the European Court in Luxembourg, pursuant to Article 234
of the EUT, which will decide on whether such laws are in breach, and
regular courts will have exempt such laws, against the laws of the
Community, from practice. 
FINAL CONSIDERATIONS: CROATIAN AND
EUROPEAN LEGAL CULTURE
The legal position of the SAA in Croatia is different from its
position in the EU. While in the EU the legal standards of the
Agreement are part of the internal legal system and are applied direct-
ly, in Croatia a practice necessarily is called up that, quite against the
intentions of the Croatian Constitution, insists, out of sheer inertia, on
additional legislation as the modus for the implementation of treaties,
hence of the SAA. This practice also exists with respect to the legal
standards that come into being through the regulative activities of the
bodies set up by the SAA – secondary legal standards – which accord-
ing to current legal approaches will not be directly applicable in
Croatia, but will at the same time be directly applicable in the states
members of the EU. For this reason legal protection against violations
of these standards will be possible before the courts of states members,
the European Court and the First Instance Court, but not before
Croatian courts. This problem is not only a technical one, but very
243
244
largely is of a conceptual nature. The law of the European Community,
the moment Croatia becomes a member of the EU, will become
Croatian law too; but the SAA is a transitional instrument – a means
that enables the gradual acceptance of the legal patrimony of the EU,
the acquis. Understanding of the SAA and the secondary law of which
it is the basis as source of international law does not help this process.
The adjustment of the Croatian legal system with the European does
not just mean the reception of a vast number of legal standards with the
constitutionally established conditions, but an organic and functional
integration and melding of the national (Croatian) and supranational
(European) legal systems.
The Europeanisation of Croatian law means above all a bridging
of the legal culture gap that has been brought about by many years of
detachment from the European and world mainstream. For Croatia, at
the level of legal theory, what started to develop in Europe with the
teaching of Rudolph von Ihering and his rejection of the dogmatic
approach is very relevant (Ihering, 1872); this created the ideological
premises for the creation of a “new European legal culture” that, as
Hesselink says, is positivist (because it is occupied with positive law
here and now) and dogmatic (for it is based on the assumption that a
legal system is coherent and integrated, and that for a given legal ques-
tion there is only one proper answer). Under the impact of European
legal standards, traditional culture was transformed and became info-
rmed by substantial elements, analytic, interdisciplinary, critical (He-
sselink, 2001). In the USA a similar process started to develop with the
work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, begetter of the school of legal realism.
Characteristics of both processes are a break with the way of thinking
connected with the forms of law, directed at legal concepts that ignore
the reality, and a down to earth approach to legal problems, which is
best expressed, perhaps, in the famed sentence of Holmes that in study-
ing law we do not study any kind of mystery, but a well known profes-
sion. The break with traditional legal culture on both sides of the At-
lantic has enabled a convergence with analysis of standards with that of
economics, society and institutions; it is precisely this radical break that
will turn out to be the key assignment of Croatian legal theory and prac-
tice in the modernisation of the legal system.
Traditional legal culture in Croatia has made possible the invet-
erate acceptance of the understanding that since, after all, the Croatian
legal system is founded upon the fine traditions of Roman law, of
Austro-Hungarian, Germanic, Central European and who knows what
other traditions, that for its harmonisation with the demands of Europe
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it is only necessary to accept a given number, true, a very large num-
ber, of legal rules; this is, after all, a merely technical task. This kind
of legal optimism has contributed to the flood of legal institutes for
which there is often no real social grounding, and no opposed interests
in the settlement of which the legal rules should be made concrete, to
do with which legal doctrine should be developed. Quite the opposite
to such an understanding, in the context of meeting the criteria for
membership in the EU, the measure of conformity and adjustment of
the legal system will be seen in its fruits, that is, the political, econom-
ic and social substances that are governed by these legal standards, and
this need to be determined empirically.
i The Interim Agreement was ratified in the CP on 5 December 2001, Official Gazette,
Treaties, no. 15.2001, and has been in force since 1 March 2002, pursuant to the
Announcement of the MFO of the Republic of Croatia of 5 February, Official Gazette,
Treaties, no. 3/2002, 22 February 2002.
ii Cf Jutarnji list, Wed. 4 September 2002, “Croatia has not met even a third of its obli-
gations to the EU”, p. 7
iii European Commission at the Regional Conference for SEE (Stability Pact), speech by
the Rt Hon. Chris Patten, CH, Member of the European Commission for External
Relations, Speech/01/489, Regional Conference for SEE, Bucharest, 25 October 2001.
iv East European Case Reporter of Constitutional Law 271, at 284 (1998). Article 68 of
the Polish Europe Agreement says: “The parties agree that an important condition of the
economic integration of Poland into the community is the harmonisation of current and
future Polish legislation with the legislation of the Community. Poland will endeavour
to make sure of gradual harmonisation of existing laws and future legislation with the
legal patrimony of the Community (the acquis).” Article 69 of the Croatian SAA contains
a similar provision.
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